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SchoolofLaw

Environmental Law and Justice Clinic

TO:

Derek Robinson, HPNS BRAC Environmental Coordinator
Department of the Navy
BRAC Program Management Office West
derek.j.robinson1@navy.mil

FROM:

Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic, Golden Gate University
School of Law

RE:

Comments to the Draft Parcel G Removal Site Evaluation Work Plan,
Former Hunters Point Naval Shipyard, San Francisco, California, June
2018

DATE:

August 14, 2018

I.

INTRODUCTION
The Environmental Law and Justice Clinic of the Golden Gate University School

of Law submits these comments to NA VFAC' s Draft Parcel G Removal Site Evaluation

Work Plan, Former Hunters Point Naval Shipyard. San Francisco, Cal(fornia, June 2018
("Draft P lan"), on behalf of Greenaction for Health and Environmental Justice and its
members and constituents in Bayview Hunters Point, San Francisco and throughout
California .
We are disappointed, to say the very least, with the Draft Plan, which
demonstrates that the Navy has learned little during its six-year journey from denying the
scope of Tetra Tech ' s fraud to reluctant acceptance that all Tetra Tech's work must be
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redone. In 2012, when the Navy learned of Tetra Tech's fraud , the Navy did nothing
meaningful to discover the extent and depth of the fraud ; and this Draft Plan again shows
the Navy contemplates no changes to business-as-usual- that is, what got them into the
Tetra Tech mess in the first place. The Navy claims it wants to repair its badly battered

relationship with the community, but in practice it continues to take actions, like this Draft
Plan, that can only further erode trust.
The Parcel G Work Plan is not a good-faith effort to investigate radiological
contamination. Rather, it relies on untrue assumptions, weakens cleanup standards and
withholds crucial information on which it is based, apparently in a multi-pronged effort to
justify minimizing the cleanup despite the massive fraud.
We urge the Navy to go back to the drawing board and come up with a realistic
plan to resample all of Tetra Tech's work- to start over- as the fraudulent data requires
and as the Navy promised. And we urge the regulators to reject this Draft Plan as
inadequate.

II.

PROCEDURAL COMMENTS
A. The Public Comment Period Cannot Close Until at Least 30 Days
After the Navy Makes Available All Documents on Which the Draft
Plan Relies
Documents that are essential to understanding the Draft Plan are being withheld

by the Navy. As the Draft Plan concedes, "The activities presented in this work plan will
be conducted in accordance with this work plan, a separate sampling and analysis plan
(SAP), and a separate accident prevention plan/site safety and health plan (APP/SSHP).
The SAP and APP/SSHP are currently being updated for submittal following this work
plan." (emphasis added, p. 1-1 ).
It is astonishing these essential documents have been withheld from the Draft
Plan. How can the public or regulators comment on a work plan calling for extensive
sampling without the sampling plan? According to the Draft Plan, the SAP contains
crucial information on Quality Assurance and Quality Control (QA/QC), the bedrock of
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data validation. If the Navy has its way, this Draft Plan's comment period will end before
the SAP, including its design for data validation, is even released.
The Draft Plan itself demonstrates how the plan cannot be evaluated without the
essential documents on which it relies. Although it does have a section on Radiological
Investigation Design, for example, it leaves essential details to the SAP: "The SAP
provides additional guidance on soil sampling, chain-of custody, laboratory analysis, and
quality assurance (QA)/quality control (QC) requirements" (p. 3-4). Any "additional
guidance" about such essential matters as sampling, chain-of-custody and QA/QC must be
provided to fully analyze the Draft Plan.
Similarly, the Draft Plan states, "[t]he analytical methods and the radionuclides
being analyzed for will be presented in the SAP and are summarized in Table 3-6." (p. 36) But when one looks at Table 3-6, it lists no analytical methods. Rather, the paragraph
before the table says gamma surveys "will be performed using detector systems equipped
with gamma spectroscopy," without identifying any such systems. The unavailable SAP
will presumably specify which systems will be used, and will provide "additional
guidance" on a range of important issues, specifics the public does not have access to and
are precluded from commenting on.
Likewise, page 3-8 of the Draft Plan states, "[t]he laboratory instruments used to
analyze the soil samples and the associated standard operating procedures (SOPs) for
calibration, maintenance, testing, inspection, and QA/QC are discussed in the SAP." How
can anyone comment on these topics absent filling in the blanks of how the analyses will
be done and how QA/QC requirements will be met?
Among other things, the Draft Plan defers to the SAPs: soil samples which "will
be submitted to the offsite analytical analysis according to the SAP" (p.3-8); "systematic
and bias samples will be containerized, labeled, and analyzed, as described in the SAP"
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(p. 3-15); "soil samples will be containerized and submitted to offsite laboratory with
appropriate chain-of custody documentation as established in the SAP" (p 3-15); "samples
will be identified, labeled, and cataloged according to the SAP" (p. 3-19); "corrective
action reports, data validation reports, quality assurance management reports, and
assessment reports are discussed in the SAP" (p. 4-4). (emphasis added in each case).
These are but a few of the details deferred, there are more examples.
Perhaps the most important example is this: "Analytical data validation will be
performed by an independent third party as described in the SAP. Data validation will be
performed on all TU/SU [trench unit/survey unit] data and all RBA [reference background
area] data" (p. 5-l). Data validation goes to the heart of proving the data aren't falsified,
unlike in the past. It is imperative that we be given the information necessary to comment
on the adequacy ofthe data validation plans.
Furthermore, there is not a single separate SAP. In fact, according to email
correspondence between counsel, there may be as many as seven SAPs, all being
withheld, each possibly detailing a different approach to the critical subjects left to the
SAPs.
Greenaction's counsel have given repeated written notice to the Navy that the
SAPs are essential to understanding and commenting on the Draft Plan and have
repeatedly asked the Navy to supply them. To date, the Navy has refused not only to
provide the documents, but even to indicate when they might be released.
The Draft Plan relies on numerous other documents that are not available. For
example, the Navy attributes its unbelievable claim that 80% ofremediated soil didn't
really need to be remediated, to a single report by the Argonne National Laboratory,

Radiological Waste Evaluation Associated with Various Base Realignment and Closure
Activities (2011). This document is not available through NAVFAC's and the regulators'
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online document repositories, nor was it readily accessible via a Google search. Hard as it
is to believe, the Final Parcel G ROD is not available on NAVFAC's website either. Nor
does the Navy website contain any of the five Tetra Tech documents referenced in the
Draft Plan. Among them are the Basewide Radiation Management Plan, Feb. 3, 2012,
which is heavily relied on by the Draft Work Plan and the Final Status Survey Results,
Building 401, Sept. 21, 2009; that building is the proposed site of background sampling

despite evidence of radiological impact in at least one section ofthe structure.
As a result ofthe Navy's failure to make available documents essential to
understanding and commenting on the Draft Plan, the Navy has failed to fulfill its public
participation obligations; it has failed to provide "sufficient information as may be
necessary to provide a reasonable explanation of the proposed plan and alternative
proposals considered," as required by 42 U.S.C. § 9617.The comment period must
therefore be extended to at least 30 days after the Navy releases all documents on which
this Draft Plan relies.
Til.

SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS- General
A. The Navy Must Live up to Its Repeated Promises

The Navy has publicly and repeatedly promised it will retest rul.areas where Tetra
Tech worked. The Draft Plan, however, contemplates no such thing. In fact, it calls for
resampling only about one-third of the trench units and only half the Tetra Tech survey
units: "Twenty-one of the 63 former sanitary sewer and storm drain TUs were selected for
the Phase 1 investigation. Fourteen ofthe 28 surface soil SUs from the Buildings
317/364/365 Former Building Site and Building 351 A Crawl Space were selected for the
Phase 1 investigation" (p. iv).
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This Draft Plan is in direct, irreconcilable contradiction to the Navy's public
promises. The Draft Plan omits them despite the fact they were made at more than one
public meeting, including a Board of Supervisor's Committee hearing.
The Navy must explain this dramatic about-face, and it must live up to its
promises to resample all of Tetra Tech's work. Unless it does, it is quite likely that
excessive levels of radioactive contamination will remain at the shipyard for generations
to come.

B. There Are No Plans For Third Party Observation to Assure Fraud Is Not
Repeated
The Draft Plan ignores some history and misstates the history it addresses.
Resampling is only being done because Tetra Tech's fraud requires that it be redone. The
Navy spent more than a year trying to avoid having to fully redo Tetra Tech's work,
hoping its data review could verify the bulk of Tetra Tech's data. But it did the opposite,
actually verifying the whistleblowers' testimony. And EPA's review found about double
the problems the data review did. Under the circumstances, the Navy had no choice but to
finally agree to discard all Tetra Tech's data.
Tetra Tech committed fraud. But the Navy is culpable too. It allowed the fraud to
take place for years, right under its nose. So did the regulators. They have thus far proven
incapable of the kind of supervision necessary to assure history does not repeat itself.
Accordingly, the Draft Plan must contain provisions for third-parties unassociated with
Tetra Tech or there-sampling contractor(s}, to observe and document the resampling
activities. As detailed further below, the Draft Plan must add a "Verification
Subcontractor" whose role will be to prevent fraud through direct observation and
videotaping of all activities (See section IV .D.l ).
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C. The Navy Must Address the Production Pressure Issue
The statements ofwhistleblowers and the admissions of Tetra Tech supervisor
Justin Hubbard, who pled guilty to federal charges, was that a primary driver of Tetra
Tech's fraud was pressure from above to get the job done under budget and on time.
According to these witnesses, this pressure started with the Navy, which pressured Tetra
Tech to meet schedules despite changes of circumstances that, if handled properly, would
have inevitably caused significant delay. In tum, Tetra Tech pressured its top onsite
management and that burden was transmitted through Health Physicist Supervisors to the
whistleblowers who committed the fraud.
The fixed-price nature of the contract also created compelling incentives to cheat,
according to witnesses. Fixed price contracts lead bidders to reduce the price as much as
possible, and maybe even more, to provide a competitive edge. Fixed price contacts
punish companies that find they have to do extensive work to do it right and rewards
companies with windfall profits if they cheat and get away with it.
The Draft Plan does not reduce or remove these negative incentives, it simply
ignores them. The Navy should look to itself and identify any and all ways its actions
could have provided incentives for fraud in order to prevent its recurrence. Like the
requirement for third-party observation, the plan should acknowledge the problem, discuss
the impact incentives may have on the execution of the work plan and describe
appropriate steps that will be taken to minimize that impact.

D. The Navy Must Revise the HRAs, ROD and ROCs
The Parcel G ROD is out of date and inaccurate. It must be revised to reflect
the actual on-the-ground post-fraud reality, particularly that improperly remediated
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soil cleared for use as backfill, relying on fraudulent data, contaminated areas of the
shipyard that were not previously contaminated, including in Parcel G.
The Draft Plan relies on the Conceptual Site Model (CSM), which, in turn,
relies on the Historical Radiological Assessments (HRAs): "The CSM is based largely
on the Historical Radiological Assessment (NAVSEA, 2004)."
But the HRAs are inconsistent with what we now know. The failure to include the
most up-to-date facts renders the HRAs inaccurate and therefore misleading. For
example, the HRAs claim Parcel A was not radiologically impacted except for one
building that was demolished. To the contrary, we have recently brought both
eyewitness and documentary proof to the Navy and regulators that it was
contaminated; samples from both the former sanitary and storm water sewer systems
revealed elevated levels of radiation that should have been investigated further but
were not.
Another example relates to whether uranium should be a radionuclide of
concern (ROC). The Navy dismisses uranium as an ROC. But long-time residents who
worked at the shipyard, or who had family members who did, have alleged for years
that uranium was used there just as carelessly as other radionuclides. They also say
experiments with depleted uranium took place. This information is readily available to
the Navy, but they never sought it. Since the Navy's plan relies heavily on the
assertion uranium is not an ROC, this potential flaw could be significant. There may
be other ROCs that have been omitted from testing based on the inaccurate HRAs; the
ROC issue must be revisited.
Neither the HRAs nor the Parcel G ROD could possibly have included any
information supplied by the whistleblowers since both documents predated them
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coming forward. Their information must inform the radiological investigation. The
whistleblowers uniformly state that fraudulent soil remediation resulted in potentially
still-contaminated soil being used as backfill throughout the shipyard; this spread
contamination to locations that were not previously impacted. Yet reliance on the
HRAs ignores this crucial evidence as well as the rest of the untapped whistleblowers'
knowledge that the Navy refuses to pursue.
Furthermore there are radically different circumstances than when the Parcel G
ROD was adopted. The most significant change has been a complete transformation in
the intended use ofthe parcel. Until just a couple years ago, only a small comer of
Parcel G was to be cleared for residential use. However, in 2016, after consideration of
the Feasibility Assessment for Evaluating Areas with Residential Land Use

Restrictions, Parcel G, Nov. 30, 2016, residential use is now permitted throughout the
entirety of Parcel G. The implications of this change could not have been factored into
either the ROD or the HRAs since they were written years earlier. Now that the Parcel
G radiological work needs to be redone, it would be foolish for the Navy and
regulators to blind themselves to the current state of reality and pretend they were
stuck in yesterday's world.
The HRAs and the major planning documents that rely on them, like the ROD,
must be updated to accurately reflect the current state of knowledge about radiological
contamination at the shipyard. Only then can cleanup planning rely on them.

E. The Navy Is Improperly Changing Remediation Goals
Remediation goals (RGs) are the standard used to determine if remediation is
necessary. Generally, if a sample analysis exceeds an RG this alone is sufficient to
determine that cleanup is required. An exception is for radium-226, which allows adding
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background levels to the RG. We believe it is an inappropriate exception insufficiently
justified by the Draft Plan. Incredibly, however, the Navy's lack of clarity seems to make
the exception the rule; all ROCs will be deemed to be compliant as long as they are below
the background radiation level PLUS the RG.
This is suggested in Table 3-2, which lists Residential Soil Remediation Goals.
Footnote "a" states, "All RGs will be applied as concentrations above background."
(emphasis added.) As we note in Section III.D., virtually all of Parcel G is now approved
for residential use. The Navy must clarify whether it intends this change and if so, go
through the appropriate process to do so.

F. Background Sample Locations Are Inappropriate
The Draft Plan fails to recognize the history of blunders and fraud in sampling
and analyzing background reference samples. According to witnesses, for years Tetra
Tech had rad techs go to the officer's club parking lot on Parcel A to obtain
background samples. However, witnesses say the samples were from an area that had
extensive amounts of "black" sand, some of which contained radiological
contamination from use for sandblasting warships used in Operation Cross Roads.
This history call into question all background samples taken from Parcel A. Based on
the recollections of people who worked in at the shipyard decades ago, future public
health and safety would be better served by assuming all of the shipyard is
radiologically impacted unless proven otherwise than by assuming the shipyard is
clean until proven otherwise.
Background levels should not be obtained from the shipyard because the historical
record shows, if the Navy would only look, that there is no place on the shipyard
which can reliably be said to have never been impacted. Rather, after geologic study,
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backgrounds should be obtained from areas nearby that have similar stone and soil
composition, with no radiological history.
Furthermore, as amplified below, the proposed location of building background
sampling is in a radiologically impacted building. There must be better choices. (See
Section III E.)

IV.

SUBSTANTIVE COMMENTS - Specific
A. The Description of the Factual Background Is False
The Navy continues its willful blindness to the best resources available to

pinpoint the fraud's impact on the cleanup, the whistleblowers. We have been urging
the Navy for more than a year to interview them to help target the resampling. The
Navy has refused, essentially saying, "It's not our job." It is the Navy's job.
No resampling plan for Parcel G or any of the other parcels should proceed
without prior investigation by the Navy of what former HPNS rad workers know about
the fraud committed in that parcel.
Furthermore, the Background section of the Executive Summary states: "An
independent third-party evaluation of previous data found evidence of manipulation
and falsification at Parcel G (Navy, 2017, 2018). As a result, the Navy developed this
work plan to investigate radiological sites in Parcel G."
This statement omits significant history. The third party evaluation did not
arise out of nowhere; it was the Navy's response to sworn statements adduced by
Greenaction and its counsel by former radiation workers at HPNS. They detailed their
participation in massive radiological fraud including soil-sample tampering, fraudulent
building scanning, data falsification and fraudulent soil remediation, among other
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things. Furthermore, the Draft Plan ignores the fact that while the third-party
evaluation identified "only" 49% of survey units (SU).with suspect data, EPA's
review found nearly double that, an astonishing 97%! By failing to acknowledge how
the fraud came to light, the Navy omits significant facts that should inform the plan to
resample Tetra Tech's work.

B. Section 1 - Introduction The Project Purpose Is Too Narrow
In addressing background samples, the Project Purpose states, "Additional
reference background areas will also be identified to confirm, or update as necessary,
estimates of naturally occurring and man-made background levels for ROCs not
attributed to Naval operations at HPNS" (p. 1-1 ).

It purports to exclude "man-made background levels for ROCs not attributed"
to the Navy. But it fails to define the internally contradictory term, "man-made
background levels;" by definition, man-made background levels are not background
levels. Nor does it provide any evidence that "man-made background levels" of
radiation not attributable to the Navy actually exist at the shipyard.
If what the Navy means is that it will not remediate in a manner that would
protect public health by claiming certain existing radiation is "man-made
background," it should admit it. If the Navy has evidence that "man-made
background" contamination exists, it must provide it. In any case, remediation of all
man-made radiation above cleanup levels is required. Accordingly, the Project
Purpose should be expanded to provide a full explanation of how background levels
will be measured, where they will come from and what impact those measurements
will have on the cleanup.
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C. Section 2 - The Conceptual Site Model Is Inaccurate and Out of
Date
a. Failure to Acknowledge the Extent of the Fraud
Like the rest of the Draft Plan, the Conceptual Site Model consistently
minimizes the fraud. If the Navy took the proof of fraud seriously, it could not propose
leaving two-thirds of the trench units and one-half of the survey units completely
untested.
Both the Executive Summary and the body of the Draft Plan exhibit how the
Navy consistently downplays the fraud. The Executive summary states, "[a]
conceptual site model (CSM) was developed with current knowledge of the site." (p. i)
This is simply untrue. As stated above, the Navy is willfully ignoring eyewitness
testimony that has been available for over a year. The body of the Draft Plan does no
better: "Following the investigation and removal actions, there were allegations that
TtEC potentially manipulated and falsely represented data." (p.2-1).
Two years ago there were "allegations." Now, taking the affidavits of the
whistleblowers and the results of the Navy's data review (which was intended to
validate Tetra Tech's data but did the opposite) and EPA's review, as well as the
criminal sentencing of two Tetra Tech supervisors, there can be no doubt that massive
fraud took place throughout the shipyard.
It may be understandable that the Navy wants to soft-peddle the fraud, as they
could have and should have prevented it and once suspicions arose they could have
and should have conducted a competent investigation. The Navy's approach has been
characterized by a long-running failure to acknowledge the seriousness of the fraud
and its impact on the cleanup.
13

The Draft Plan continues this failure. For example, the Draft Plan claims that
there is uncertainty about the sampling and data fraud, stating, "Allegations of
previous sample collection fraud, improper sample and document custody/controls,
and data manipulation could indicate that contamination was potentially left at the
site" (p. iii).But, as stated above, the whistleblowers have sworn they participated in
massive fraud under oath. "Could indicate" is inaccurate. Their testimony proves
without doubt that significant contamination was left at the site un-remediated and that
improperly remediated soil may have contaminated sites that had not previously been
tainted. This needs to be investigated in Parcel G and the other places Tetra Tech
worked.
b. The Navy's Suggestion of Over-Remediation Is Sheer Speculation
While characterizing proven facts as uncertainties, the Navy indulges in pure
speculation, making the astonishing assertion that, "[t]he previous work relied on a
quicker, less accurate method for analyzing radium-226 (226Ra). This method was
known by stakeholders at the time to be biased high. A large amount of soil (estimated
80 percent) was likely mischaracterized as contaminated (Argonne National
Laboratory, 2011)."
In other words, the Navy now claims that notwithstanding the fraud, things
aren't as bad as they seem. 80% of the soil characterized as contaminated wasn't!
Never mind that the alleged stakeholders are not identified and the Navy offers
no evidence of agreement among them. Never mind that the Argonne National
Laboratory report cited has not been made available to the public by the Navy so we
cannot test this dubious assertion.
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Similarly, the body of the Draft Plan claims the onsite lab was biased high: "In
addition, the onsite laboratory used a screening method2 to analyze radium-226
(226Ra) that may have reported at levels higher than actual radioactivity. TtEC
presented CSMs in removal action completion reports that were based on potentially
falsified data and screening results for 226Ra reported by the onsite laboratory (results
were often biased high)."
Footnote 2 states:
"Analytical results for 226Ra were reported by the onsite laboratory using a
screening method based on the 186 kiloelectron volt (keV) energy peak. The
offsite laboratory analyzed 226Ra using a definitive method (EPA 901.1
comparable method), allowing the soil samples to equilibrate (21-day ingrowth) and reported concentrations using the 609 keV energy peak for
bismuth-214 (214Bi) because 214Bi is in secular equilibrium with 226Ra.
Comparisons between the onsite laboratory screening results and the offsite
laboratory definitive results for 226Ra demonstrate the onsite laboratory results
were consistently biased high. The 226Ra analytical results from the onsite
laboratory resulted in false exceedances of the RGs, which resulted in the
initiation of remediation. Remediation may have been avoided had soil
samples been allowed to equilibrate (21-day in-growth) and decisions had been
based on the more reliable 214Bi analysis using the 609 keV energy peak."
In other words, the Navy claims it over-remediated for radium-226 in 80% of
the remediated soil. This assertion inadvertently illustrates the Navy's conundrum.
Either it wasted millions upon millions of dollars to clean up contaminated soil that
wasn't really contaminated or the Conceptual Site Model on which the Draft Plan rests
is demonstrably wrong. Either serves as an acknowledgement of the Navy's technical
incompetence and the waste of time and money that resulted from it.
The Navy's claim the onsite laboratory method was improperly biased is
hardly reassuring. The Navy itself approved the laboratory methods. If the Navy fmds
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fault with the methods now, it only has itself to blame. How many years did it rely on
methods whose results it wants to explain away?
Additionally, the Navy acknowledges the method was "quicker." The Navy
must address whether the method it now disowns was wholly or partially selected
because it was faster than others to speed production. This would substantiate the
whistleblowers testimony.
Although the Navy disparages the onsite laboratory method, the Draft Plan is
so imprecise it does not actually state that this method will not be used in future. Nor
does it specify what better methods will be used
The Work Plan is also imprecise when it comes to determining the background
level ofradium-226. The text of the plan never suggests that any other radionuclide
than bismuth could be used as a substitute for radium. Only delving into the footnotes
to Table 3-6 does one discover the Navy may also use lead-214, either with bismusth214 or standing alone. And yet, while the Navy at least attempts to demonstrate the
bismuth equivalency, it does not even bother as to lead-214. It must.
Despite what the Plan implies by describing the radium-226 method it intends
to use as "definitive," the Navy admits it will not use an approved EPA method.
Rather, it will use an unspecified "comparable" method. If the Navy relies on this
"comparable" method, it must identify it and demonstrate that it is, indeed,
comparable.
c. The Nayy Should not Speculate About Sources of Radioactivity
The Navy claims that a third uncertainty is: "[t]he RGs used previously are
within background ranges. Therefore, soil that was considered contaminated could
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have been attributable to naturally occurring radioactivity or anthropogenic fallout
(Argonne National Laboratory, 2011)." The Navy should either report data to
demonstrate that naturally occurring radioactivity or fallout impact the cleanup rather
than speculate that it "could have been."
In addition, Table 2-1 needs to be corrected. For example, under "current
status" it says, "All known sources removed by Navy using standards at the time.
Follow-up investigations resulted in removal of small volumes of soil to meet current
RGs." However, the "follow up investigations" are left undescribed, not even saying
how many "investigations" were conducted, let alone who conducted them. Nor do are
the "results" that prompted additional remediation reported. Similarly, Table 2-1
states, "Trench excavations that have been backfilled now contain homogenized soil
from onsite fill, offsite fill, or a mixture of both." This statement ignores the certainty
that "onsite fill" may have still contained levels of contaminants exceeding the RGs
when it was used as fill, the result of fraudulent soil scanning. Table 2-1 also is
consistent with the rest of the Draft Plan in the way it minimizes the fraud; the only
reference to it is, "Potential for data manipulation or falsification."
Again, the witness testimony and the Navy's and EPA's data reviews prove
that the data falsification was real and extensive, not "potential."

D. Section 3 - The Soil Investigation Design and Implementation Is
Inadequate
1. Data Quality Objectives

Section 3.1 ofthe Draft Plan states,"[t]he primary objective is to determine
whether site conditions are compliant with the Parcel G ROD RAO (Navy, 2009)"
(p.3-1).
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Step 5 of Section 3.1 indicates that if RGs are exceeded, "then the data will be
evaluated to determine whether site conditions are protective of human health using
USEPA's current guidance on Radiation Risk Assessment at Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA) Sites (USEPA,
2014). A Removal Site Evaluation Report will be developed to include
recommendations for further action."
RGs are set precisely to be ''protective of human health." The Navy does not
explain why it intends to conduct this additional risk assessment rather than do what is
called for: remediate all soil and buildings that exceed the RGs. Given the history of
the remediation and the approach of the Draft Plan, it is difficult not to conclude that
this is yet another attempt to minimize the problem, and thus minimize the
remediation necessary for free release.
Step 6 of Section 3.1 states: "If any 226Ra gamma spectroscopy concentration
is greater than the RG for 226Ra, then the soil sample will be analyzed for 238U and
226Ra using comparable analytical methods (e.g., alpha spectrometry for 238U and
radon emanation for 226Ra). For that specific sample, the 238U alpha spectrometry
result will be used as a more representative estimate of the background value for
226Ra, and the alpha spectrometry comparable result for 226Ra will be compared to
the RG for 226Ra using the revised background value" (p.vi). In other words, the
calculation of radium background levels depends on the uranium results.
However, the Navy has offered insufficient validation data for this switch. Its
explanation for why uranium background levels provide more reliable data on radium
background is unconvincing. Even assuming substituting uranium for radium is
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appropriate, the Navy offers no evidence that uranium-238 alpha spectroscopy
provides "a more representative estimate of the background value of 226Ra" than Ra226 gamma spectroscopy. If that is the case, the Navy should provide the evidence.
In addition, as stated, there is evidence that the shipyard was impacted by
uranium. Thus, it must be included in the list of ROCs. As an ROC, it should not be
the basis for calculating background levels of any other ROC.
Step 7 of Section 3.1 reiterates the Executive Summary's admission the Navy
has no intention to resample all of Tetra Tech's work. This subject will be addressed
in comments below. Section 3.1 also repeats the phrase "man-made background," an
issue already addressed above. (See Section IVB.)
Section 3.2 addresses Radionuclides of Concern. As stated above, the list of
ROCs must be augmented to reflect what is now known about the radionuclides that
impacted the shipyard. The Navy must add instruments that can identify alpha and
beta radiation, as needed, to investigate the presence of the expanded list of ROCs.
Section 3.4 describes the design of the radiological investigation. It states,
"[t]he radiological investigation design is primarily based on methods, techniques, and
instrument systems in the Basewide Radiological Management Plan (TtEC, 2012)."
Like the Argonne National Laboratory reference, this Management Plan was not
provided by the Navy even though it is relied on by the Draft Plan.
Sections 3.44 through 3.7 address the proposed two-phase approach to soil
sampling. As argued below, this approach is further evidence the Navy will jettison
the commitments made publicly to resample all of Tetra Tech's work. Phase I must be
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applied to 100% of the sites Tetra Tech worked on rather than mere fractions of them.
If that is done, Phase II must be reconsidered.
Section 3.5, on instrumentation, must be augmented to account for an
expanded list of ROCs to include equipment that can investigate alpha and beta
radiation as well as gamma.
In numerous places, the Draft Plan indicates scanning will be done with
sodium iodide (Nai) detectors. (See, for example, Section 3. 5.1.) However there is no
justification for using Nai detectors when there are more sensitive instruments
available. High Purity Germanium (HPGe) detectors are an alternative that are much
more sensitive than other hand held instruments, for example. The Draft Plan should
discuss what equipment was considered and should state the reasons for the selection.
Section 3.6 describes the radiological investigation implementation. It starts by
listing the seven types of subcontractors that will provide support services. There is an
eighth that must be added: a verification subcontractor to observe and videotape the
other contractors, particularly those doing sampling and scanning, to assure there is no
possibility of fraud in future. Greenaction strongly urges the Navy to require that any
verification contractor hire and train residents of the Bayview Hunters Point
communities for this purpose. This will serve three positive goals: preventing fraud;
providing jobs; and building trust; approaching fraud prevention in a way that relies on
local community members and can, in turn, inform and build trust among the broader
public.
Furthermore, the training plan is deficient in in that it perpetuates the Navy's
minimization of the fraud. Nowhere does the Draft Plan require that all contractors'
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personnel be informed of the types of fraud Tetra Tech committed, that improper
practices will not be tolerated and they will be observed and videotaped to assure the
integrity of the investigation.

2. Phase I Soil
The Navy claims that, "[a] phased investigation approach is presented in this
work plan that was designed to provide a high level of confidence that current site
conditions either comply or do not comply with the Parcel G ROD RAO (Navy,
2009)" (p. iv). We hope the Navy considers public comments and significantly alters
the plan to provide a basis for that confidence. To the contrary, the current plan
undermines it.
If the history of the Tetra Tech fraud and the Navy's complicity in it teaches
anything, it is that the Navy has always been overconfident. It was confident Tetra
Tech could investigate itself. It was confident in the accuracy of Tetra Tech's false
conclusion that the fraud was narrowly limited. It was confident the whistleblowers
were mistaken or lying. It was confident the data review would validate Tetra Tech's
data. In each case, the Navy was wrong, its confidence was unwarranted.
The public cannot be confident the Draft Plan will provide adequate data to
demonstrate compliance with the ROD. First, as mentioned, the Navy does not plan to
even test substantial amounts of soil.
The Navy will not find contamination it refuses to look for. All trench and
survey units and any other work or locations worked on by Tetra Tech must be
sampled.
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The Draft Plan also is significantly deficiency in its lack of specificity about
the handling of backfilled soil and soil excavated from side walls (and bottoms). If
contaminated backfilled soil and side wall soil are mixed, previously uncontaminated
soil may become contaminated. The Draft Plan must require that backfilled soil and
side wall soil be segregated, scanned and cleared separately.
Other problems also bedevil Phase I. The Draft Plan states, "The targeted TUs
and SUs were selected based on the highest potential for radiological contamination,"
based on, "[h]istorical documentation of specific potential upstream sources, spills, or
other indicators of potential contamination," and "[s]igns of potential manipulation or
falsification from the soil data evaluation" (p. iv).
Again, the historical record on which the Draft Wok Plan relies is
demonstrably wrong. Again, the Navy claims it will use the best data while
simultaneously ignoring the best evidence available to it.
Furthermore the Navy claims it can use signs of manipulation and falsification
in the "soil data evaluation" of Tetra Tech's data to target Phase I resampling. That
can only be true if the Navy ignores the EPA's review of the Parcel G soil data
evaluation, which found 97% of the data to be suspect. Precisely how the Navy will
use data that is 97% unreliable to target one-third of the trench units and half the
survey units is left unexplained.
The two factors the Navy claims it can use to narrow Phase I soil sampling are
patently false. There is no rational basis stated in the Draft Plan on which to select
samples sites with ''the highest potential for radiological contamination."
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Furthermore, the Work Plan says the sanitary and storm water sewer systems
"will be gamma scanned." Gamma scanning is necessary but insufficient. As
discussed above, the number ofradionuclides of concern (ROCs) must be significantly
expanded to account for the true historical evidence. Gamma scanning cannot identify
all of the ROCs that should be included. Consequently, scanning for alpha and beta
radiation will be necessary.

3. Phase II Soil
As stated, Phase II must be reconsidered in light of the changes necessary to
Phase 1. However, assuming Phase II as described is relevant, the plan states that,
"subsurface soil samples will be collected via borings. The borings will be advanced
beyond the floor boundary of the trench or to the point of refusal. Gamma scans of the
core will be conducted" (p. v.).
Although the Navy agrees to excavate and scanlOO% of the soil from the sewer
systems in Phase I, it plans no such comprehensive effort during Phase II. It does not
even attempt to explain why.
Borings alone are completely inadequate. They will not provide sufficiently
comprehensive information to properly investigate the exceptional history of radiation
contamination in Parcel G, including the likelihood that fraudulent practices resulted
in contaminating soils and areas that were not previously contaminated.
And, as mentioned, the plan to limit scanning to gamma radiation is
inappropriate to the expanded number of ROCs an updated understanding of the
historical record will identify.
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E. Section 4 - Building Investigations
"Buildings will be divided into SUs, and the size and boundary of the SUs will
be based on the previous plans and reports" (p. v.) These "plans and reports" go
unidentified. The Draft Plan must provide a factual rationale for the size and borders
of the building SUs.
The Draft Plan also states that only the interior of buildings will be scanned,
but gives no rational basis for excluding exteriors. The Draft Plan must either include
building exteriors or justify excluding them.
In addition, according to Figure 4-1, building background reference samples
will be taken from Building 401, a building that has been radiologically impacted.
This location is apparently justified by the Navy's assertion that the first floor was not
impacted. It defies the imagination that there is not a more suitable location. Perhaps
from a building no part of which was ever impacted? Like many other portions of the
Draft Plan there is a paucity of information, this time on the building background
sample selection process. It should be fully described, including justification for the
site or sites selected.
Section 4.5.5 calls for portable survey instruments to be calibrated at least once
a year. This is far too long a period to demonstrate to a distrustful community that data
will be developed using properly calibrated instruments. The Navy should propose a
shorter time period between calibrations and the rationale for its choice.

F. Section 5- Data Evaluation and Reporting
Section 5.2 states, "The effort expended during DQA should be consistent with
the graded approach used to develop the survey design." The Navy should explain
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what "graded approach" means. This section also contains an unnecessarily complex
set of calculations to calculate equivalents of different units of measure. Subsection
5.2.2.1 states, "The RGs for buildings surfaces (Table 4-2) are stated in units of
dpm/100 cm2 [disintegration(s) per minute per 100 square centimeters]; however,
alpha and beta static measurement results will be reported in units of counts during a
specified counting interval, while scan measurement results will be reported in units of
cpm [counts per minute]." The formula for conversion into dpm/100cm2 follows. The
Navy fails to explain why it does not intend to report results as dpm/100cm2 in the
first place.
One glaring shortcoming of the Draft Plan evident throughout is the different
treatment given to samples that exceed the RGs and those that do not. Samples below
the RG are simply declared compliant with the ROD. No further investigation is called
for. In sharp contrast, should a sample exceed an RG, it undergoes additional
confirmation. For example, Section 5.2.3 says, "If all measurement or sample results
from a TU/SU are below the corresponding radionuclide-specific RG values or
corresponding investigation level values, the TU/SU complies with the Parcel G ROD
RAO." But Section 5.3.2 states, "The first step in investigating potential areas of
elevated activity is to confirm the measurement or sample results that indicated the
potential area of elevated activity." A similar provision applies to buildings (See Draft
Plan Section 4.1 ).
We agree validation of sample results is essential. Why then is there no parallel
requirement that any samples initially determined to be below the RGs undergo further
investigation as well? It is equally likely that sample and analysis variability will result
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in lower readings as higher ones. The difference in treatment is an example of how
the Navy will go to some lengths to attempt to disprove an elevated reading while
making no similar efforts to see if non-elevated readings could be just as wrong.
Section 5.2 goes on to state, "In most cases, at least one measurement or
sample result documenting the lack of elevated activity will be required to support a
decision to terminate the investigation of a potential area of elevated activity." One of
how many? If there are multiple samples that exhibit elevated activity but one that
does not, is the decision to terminate the investigation justified?

G. Section 7- Waste Management Plan
Section 7.5 relates to compliance with CERCLA's Offsite Rule. It says "the
contractor will request proof of Offsite Rule approval from the offsite disposal facility
before transferring any wastes to an offsite facility." What it doesn't say is that the
approval actually is granted and proof of it must be presented before the transfer. It
must.

V.

CONCLUSION
The Draft Parcel G Work Plan is woefully deficient. It must be revised to

incorporate these comments and those of other interested members ofthe community.
If not, the community can add just another occasion to the many, many before it over
the years that the Navy has lied to them.
Laura Duchnak, director of the Navy's Base Realignment and Closure
Program, acknowledged in writing in a victim-impact statement for the sentencing of
one of Tetra Tech's supervisors that the community has lost all faith in the Navy's
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ability to do a proper cleanup. The distressing deficiencies in the Draft Plan and the
comer-cutting evident in it, only deepen distrust.
The Draft Pian must be wholly reworked so that all of the sites Tetra Tech
worked on will be fully resampled, as the Navy promised.

Respectfully submitted,

August 14, 2018
Steven J Castleman
Visiting Associate Professor & Staff Attorney
Environmental Law and Justice Clinic
415-442-6675 I scastleman@,ggu.edu
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